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Abstract 
 
Nowadays, with an increasingly aging population, an increasing size of the population on 
disability benefits, and an implicitly lower level of economic output and foregone tax 
revenue, disability has become a major public policy issue in many countries. Estimating 
both single risk and competing risks models on a Swedish longitudinal database, this study 
analyzes the risk of exit due to disability at a certain age, conditional on having remained in 
the labor force until that age. The explanatory variables had not identical coefficients across 
destination types. For example, the estimated single risk model shows that a higher level of 
education decreased the hazard to exit the labor market with a disability pension, while the 
estimated competing risks model suggests that a higher level of education decreases 
increased the hazard of exiting with a partial disability pension, but it decreased the hazard 
to exit with a full disability pension.   
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1. Introduction 
Working people are often exposed to physical, chemical, biological, and psychosocial 
factors that can cause short-term and/or long-term health problems, many of which could be 
prevented or controlled. Many of these people may end up with a disability. The 
complexity of the disability phenomenon is in part pictured by the evolution of its 
definition over time, which is presented in the Appendix.  
 Disability (and working capacity justifying a disability benefit) may also result from a 
number of diseases, injuries, or disorders that affect the visual, hearing, locomotor, or 
mental functions. Disability can affect working people of all ages, it diminishes life quality, 
and it increases the need for care and support from family and community members, as well 
as from health and social services. “Disability dependence” occurs when, for these reasons 
or others, employees do not return to work, although they may be capable of doing so. 
Instead, they become economically dependent on public or private financial support.  
 The economic approach to disability can take diverse forms, usually starting from the 
loss of working capacity, and related productivity loss, and then focusing on various 
aspects of exit, including economic relations with employers, social insurance officers, 
program administrators, and household members. The survey of Haveman and Wolfe 
(2000) discusses the main lines of economic research, addressing the issues of economic 
status and behavior of the working-age population with disabilities. Bound and Burkhauser 
(1999) review the behavioral and redistributive effects of transfer programs targeted on 
working people with disabilities, and they review the literature on the labor supply behavior 
of people with disabilities and how it is affected by disability program characteristics.1 
 In Sweden, although substantial public attention has focused on training and 
rehabilitation, labor market entry and placement of disabled workers, the problem of 
employees leaving the labor market early due to disability has received far less recognition. 
                                                 
1
 There have been few studies on disability exits from the labor market in Sweden (e.g., Berglind 1977; 
Hedström 1980; Wadensjö 1985, 1996; Hansson-Brusewitz 1992; Månsson et al. 1994, 1996; Wadensjö and 
Palmer 1996; Palme and Svensson 1997). Summarizing their findings, it seems that, there were three groups of 
independent variables that influenced the exit into disability: demographic variables; labor market variables and 
health variables. 
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Nowadays, however, with an increasingly aging population and a declining working-age 
population, disability has become a major public policy issue (not only in Sweden, but in 
many other countries as well). In addition to the aging issue, this attention is also explained 
by the increasing size of the population on disability benefits (10% of the working age 
population in December 2004), the increasing cost (64 billion kronor, the highest in the 
2004 state budget),2 and by an implicitly lower level of economic output and foregone tax 
revenue. The Government estimated the future cost for today’s disability pensioners to 639 
billion kronor (Riksrevisionen, 2005). Given that the percentage of younger people 
increased most, it is useful to learn more about the age of the first exit from the labor 
market due to disability and circumstances surrounding exit. Estimating both single risk 
and competing risks models using a longitudinal database for 1983-1991, this study 
analyzes the risk of exit due to disability at a certain age, conditional on having remained in 
the labor force until that age. 
 The study is organized as follows: the next section presents briefly the institutional 
and empirical framework, upon which our study is based, while sections 3 and 4, present 
the data, and the estimated results. The last section summarizes and draws conclusions.  
2. The institutional and empirical framework  
Prior to 1991, it was possible to be awarded a permanent or temporary disability pension on 
medical grounds, for those aged 16-64; or on medical and labor market grounds (i.e., due to 
long-term unemployment), for those aged 60-65.3 Eligibility requirements for disability 
benefits have been tightened in successive reforms throughout the 1990s, and since 1997 
medical reasons are the only valid criteria for granting a disability pension.  
To be entitled to a disability pension, a physician must certify that the individual’s 
capacity to work is reduced by at least 25%. If capacity to work is reduced for a long period 
but not necessarily permanently, the individual is entitled to a temporary disability pension 
                                                 
2
 In November 2005, 1 EURO ≈ 9,5 Kronor and 1 USD ≈ 8 kronor. 
3
 Since January 2003, the terms disability pension and temporary disability pension were replaced by activity 
compensation for people between the ages of 19-29 and sickness compensation for those aged between 30-64. 
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(granted for up to 3 years at a time). This is determined with the help of a medical 
evaluation. 
Disability pensions were payable in full, three quarters, two thirds, half or one quarter 
of the full rate basic pension and supplementary pension. Full disability pensions as basic 
pensions used to correspond to the full old age pension. Since 1st July 1995 however, the 
level for the basic pension has been reduced to 90% of the base amount for single 
pensioners and 72.5% for married pensioners. Since 1st January 1996, disability pensioners 
also receive the lower amount if their spouse is not drawing a pension. The reduced levels 
have partly been reimbursed for by a raised pension supplement. 
 The social insurance system is built in such way that it gives employees whose 
working capacity is (or may be considered to be) reduced due to sickness or injury a choice 
between various early-exit pathways from the labor market. When choosing a temporary or 
permanent early exit from the labor market, employees are assumed to maximize their 
lifetime utility. The choice alternative for an employee after a long-term sickness can be 
return-to-work, partial disability or full disability, and full or partial early retirement with 
the old-age system from age 60. The exit from the labor market due to disability is not 
completely an individual decision, as it is conditional on a medical evaluation, as well as a 
work capacity evaluation of a social insurance officer. Additionally, we assume that 
financial and psychological dependence may negatively affect employees who become 
disabled. Thus, the decision to exit with a disability pension may be difficult to accept. 
Employees who suffer from a chronic sickness, for example, may find themselves in a gray 
area, where they would qualify for a disability pension, but could continue to work. It is 
assumed, then, that the individual decision is made on the basis of actual utility given the 
financial resources. Given the financial resources provided by the disability pension, the 
decision may be for disability if the employee values more leisure and/or “psychic gains” 
that do not relate to the job or work environment, or for work if the employee enjoys work 
and/or can cope with the work environment, and/or derives utility from the social network 
related at work, and related factors, such as the structure of a fixed schedule. 
 We assume people make rational choices under uncertainty in a given risky 
environment and these choices both determine the hazard of exit, and the change in it over 
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time. According to Lancaster (1990), if we could observe the hazard function of a number 
of people living in the same risky environment and using the same decision making policy, 
or operating in environments and using policies which differ in known ways, we could 
confirm or refute the theory of their behavior and determine parameters that could be 
interpreted according to economic theory. Our aim is to estimate the hazard of exit, which 
is the risk that a person will exit at a certain age due to disability, assuming that (s)he has 
remained in the labor force until that age. The framework outlined above and the data allow 
for various types of early withdrawal from the labor force. Therefore, the exit decision will 
be estimated within a duration framework using both single risk and competing risks 
models.
4
  
3. The data 
The data, which come from the Long-term Sickness (LS) database owned by the Swedish 
National Social Insurance Board, include longitudinal information for about 4500 people 
during 1983-1991, on personal characteristics, earnings, history of sickness absenteeism 
from 1983, and rehabilitation history from 1986, and all exits from the labor market.5 There 
are two random samples of Swedish insured population on working age. The first sample 
(IP) is representative for Swedish population, aged 20 to 64 during 1986-1991. The second 
(LSIP) is essentially the same as the first, except that everyone had at least one sickness 
spell of at least 60 days during the period 1986-1989. The IP sample includes about 1800 
persons, while the LSIP sample one includes about 2700 persons. Both samples are 
analyzed here, allowing us to draw conclusions about slightly different populations: the IP 
sample is representative for the Swedish population on working age, while the LSIP sample 
is representative for the Swedish working population with a relatively bad health status.  
Table A1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the analyzed samples by 
disability pension status, reported at exit date, which is either the actual date of first exit, or 
the end of the observation period (December 31, 1991) for those who had not exited. 
                                                 
4
 See Andrén (2001) for a detailed description of these models. 
5
 See Andrén (2001) for a detailed description of the LS-database. 
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4. Estimation results and discussion  
In this study, we focus only on exits due to disability. Waiting time until the first exit from 
the labor market due to disability was measured in years of age, because both the age when 
people started to work, and their working history were not in the data. Nevertheless, even if 
these data were available, we will still prefer the years of age because: 1) the employees’ 
productivity may fall bellow what (s)he is paid, creating an incentive for the employer to 
“push” them on the direction of exit, and perhaps to lose interest in helping them; 2) the 
employees working capacity may decline due to a number of factors (i.e., the work 
environment/tasks are no longer as suitable; the employees’ physical capacity may 
deteriorate due to a long absence of sufficient physical activity; health can become poorer; 
skills may become outdated, and the willingness or capacity to accommodate to change 
lower; they may desire more leisure, etc.). Therefore, exit alternatives may look more 
attractive at different ages, regardless of when people started to work. On the other hand, a 
long working career itself may be a factor of increasing importance with increasing age. At 
any given age, the hazard of exiting for those who did not exit earlier was estimated both 
nonparametrically and semiparametrically.   
4.1. Nonparametric results 
Nonparametric analysis let the dataset speak for itself and makes no assumption about the 
functional form of the survival function and thus no assumptions about hazard or 
cumulative hazard functions. Additionally, the effects of the covariates are not modeled, the 
comparison of the survival experience is done at a qualitative level across the values of 
covariates.  
 Figure 1 shows the smoothed hazard functions for the two samples by disability 
pension rate. The hazard of early exit was higher for the LSIP sample than for the IP 
sample. In the IP sample, the hazard of exit with a full pension increased dramatically at 
about age 50, and shortly thereafter for partial pensions, while in the LSIP sample, there 
were no such clear “break-points”. Instead, there was a steady increase starting much 
earlier. The difference seems clearly explained by the different health status of the samples, 
previous long-term sickness seems often to be a “precursor” to earlier exit. Therefore, an 
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obvious policy recommendation is that, in addition to the (widely) used policies providing 
income support for disable people, policies designed to enable workers on sick leave to 
return to work should be used.  
 
Figure 1 here   
 
4.2. Semiparametric results 
Table 1 shows the estimates of a Cox model for all types of exit, and separately for each 
type for the IP sample, and Table 2 shows these estimates for the LSIP sample. These are 
discussed separately. The likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
explanatory variables have identical coefficients across destination types is significant at 
well beyond the .01 level for both IP and LSIP samples, and therefore we reject the 
hypothesis. These results suggested that the analysis must be done by exit type.    
 
Table 1  here 
 
Table 2 here 
 
A. The working-age sample 
For the IP sample, considering all exits together, except gender, marital status and 
educational level dummies, all other variables are statistically significant by conventional 
criteria. Naturalized Swedes were 3 times as likely as Swedish born people to leave the 
labor force earlier due to disability at any given age, while foreigners were about 5.13 times 
as likely at any age. Citizenship may be a proxy for culture and attitudes toward work, as 
well as, human and perhaps health capital when starting working, but also for occupation, 
work environment and working conditions. Many of those who are not Swedish born 
immigrated to Sweden before 1973, during a period characterized mainly by an 
economically motivated migration. Given the health and human capital at that time (which 
not necessarily were the same as for Swedish born people), if they had jobs that required 
mainly (heavy) physical effort, the results here would not be unexpected.  
Previous history of sickness mattered: for each one hundred days of previous 
sickness, there was about a 25% increase in the risk of exit, but for each additional spell of 
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sickness there was a decrease of 7.9% in the risk of disability exit.  
Regional unemployment was also a significant push factor for exit: each one percent 
increase in the regional unemployment rate was associated with about a 30% increase in the 
risk of exit due to disability.  
When a distinction was made among different kinds of exit (i.e., full or part-time) in 
the IP sample, it was found that compared to people with lower education, higher education 
decreased the hazard of exit with a full disability pension, but increased hazard of exit with 
partial disability benefit. The first result can be attributed to investment in health, but also 
by different work environments and working conditions for persons with low and high 
education. The second result may indicate that it is easier for persons with higher education 
to remain in the workforce (at least partially).  
Foreign-born people were about 9.5 times as likely as Swedish born to exit with a full 
disability pension, while naturalized Swedes were about 5.5 times as likely. Being in a 
rehabilitation program (both vocational and medical) increased the probability of exit with 
a part-time benefit, but being in a vocational rehabilitation had no significant impact on exit 
with full disability. This may mean that participation in a rehabilitation program could be 
considered somewhat successful, in that some people can combine part-time work with 
partial benefit. 
 
B. Working population with a relatively bad health status 
For the LSIP sample, when no distinction was made among different kinds of exits (i.e., 
considering all exits together), except dummies for gender and medium level of education, 
all other variables were statistically significant at the 10% level. The hazard of exit for 
married people was about 80% of the hazard of singles. The hazard of exit for higher 
educated people was about 66% of the hazard of lower educated people, and even lower 
(about 48%) for exits with full benefit.  
 Naturalized Swedes were about 1.7 times as likely to exit due to disability as Swedish 
born people, while the foreign born were 2.5 times as likely as the Swedish born. These 
proportions were even higher for full benefits, and lower for part-time benefits.  
 Being in a rehabilitation program (both vocational and medical) increased the 
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probability of exit: Those who participated in a vocational rehabilitation program were 
about 1.3 times as likely to exit with full benefit as those who had not, and about 3.07 times 
as likely to exit with a part-time benefit. Those who participated in a medical rehabilitation 
program were about 1.9 times as likely to exit with full benefit as those who had not, and 
about 1.7 times as likely to exit with a part-time benefit. It seems that vocational 
rehabilitation had a higher impact on the decision of part-time pensions, while medical 
rehabilitation had a higher impact on exits with full pension. This may be associated with 
likelihood for persons with more severe medical problems to require medical rehabilitation, 
whereas vocational rehabilitation provides a means to remain active at least part-time.  
 Previous history of sickness had significant effects on the hazard of exit: for each one 
hundred days of previous sickness there was about an 11.9% increase in the risk of exit, and 
even higher (about 14%) for full pensions, but lower (about 7.4%) for part-time benefits. 
On the other hand, each additional spell of previous sickness was associated with about a 
8.2% decrease in the risk of exit. As we have seen in the descriptive statistics of the 
samples, persons with a previous history of long-term sickness often have a history of many 
spells. One possible explanation of this is that previous sickness spells give people the 
opportunity to recuperate, thus delaying or avoiding exit due to disability. This is a result 
that supports the belief that preventing and controlling the deterioration of the health capital 
of people would decrease the number of exits from the labor market due to disability. 
Unemployment was again a significant push factor: Each one percent increase in the 
regional unemployment rate was associated with about 6.1% increase in the risk of exit, and 
even higher (14.1%) for full pension; and it was associated with about 10.5% decrease in 
the risk of exit with part-time benefit, which can be related to the fear of getting 
unemployed.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
The risk of exit due to disability at a certain age, conditional on having remained in the 
labor force until that age was analyzed using a Cox model for all types of exit, and 
separately for each type of exit. The explanatory variables had not identical coefficients 
across destination types. For example, the estimated single risk model shows that a higher 
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level of education decreased the hazard to exit the labor market with a disability pension, 
while the estimated competing risks model suggests that a higher level of education 
decreases increased the hazard of exiting with a partial disability pension, but it decreased 
the hazard to exit with a full disability pension.   
 The results show that participation in a vocational rehabilitation program increased 
the risk of exit with a partial disability, which could imply that rehabilitation was in a way 
efficient (in the sense that people are kept in the labor market). For persons with more 
severe medical problems, this may be associated with likelihood to require medical 
rehabilitation, whereas vocational rehabilitation may provide a mean to remain active at 
least part-time. Reducing the incidence and severity of disability in a population involves 
changes in the social and physical environment at work, changing attitudes towards what is 
required of especially older workers and what individuals should require of themselves in 
society, as well as changing individual performance (by improving physical capacity, 
learning new skills, being flexible enough to change tasks/jobs, etc.). Therefore, the health 
and educational systems should be developed in such a way to make it easier for 
individuals to achieve human and health capital that would allow them to reach a higher 
level of welfare. The development of strategies to reduce “disability dependence” thus 
requires detailed understanding of the underlying systems for rehabilitation and financial 
support, including the structure of the support and service system, the routes by which one 
enters it, and those by which one can exit, as well as the characteristics of the worker who 
becomes disabled. More effort should be made to design flexible programs that can be 
adapted to individual needs. Making the alternative of returning to work more attractive 
would reduce the economic burdens on society, and it would improve the quality of life and 
self-esteem of many employees who otherwise might have become disabled as well.  
The decision to exit the labor market is an extreme alternative, and is not always the 
best alternative for the individual. On the other hand, even supposing that it is accepted that 
working some hours has a positive impact on individuals with health problems, it is 
difficult to match individuals with available jobs on the market. In such conditions, the 
process of integrating these people in the labor market becomes very complex, and it 
requires resources allocated on both sides: training and/or vocational rehabilitation of those 
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individuals, and the improvement of the working conditions and rethinking the job tasks in 
general. One possible proposal for policy would be that more resources should be allocated 
for preventing long-term sickness in general, but especially focus on the work environment 
for groups at higher risk. Even with these improvements, disability will always be a very 
complex phenomenon that requires dynamic and flexible policies aimed to a better well 
being of the individuals themselves, and the welfare of society in general.  
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Appendix  
A1 The definition of disability 
The World Health Organization made an attempt in 1980 to find a way out from the 
dilemma of a right term for disability by issuing the International Classification of 
Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps (ICIDH). “Disability” was defined as “any 
restriction or inability (resulting from an impairment) to perform an activity in the manner 
or within the range considered normal for a human being”. ICIDH was criticized as model 
of consequence of disease in the following years, and a new version, ICIDH-2, is currently 
being drafted. It differs substantially from the original one, being a classification of human 
health and disability, systematically arranged according to somatic, psychological and 
social levels. ICIHD has moved away from its old focus on the impacts of diseases or other 
health conditions (the 1980’s “consequence of disease” classification) to a new focus on 
what constitutes health (today’s “components of health” classification). Both a “medical 
model” and a “social model” have been proposed for understanding and explaining 
disability and health (The term “model” here means an explanatory style or paradigm). The 
medical model views disability as “a personal problem, directly caused by disease, trauma 
or other health condition, which requires medical care provided in the form of individual 
treatment by professionals”. The social model, on the other hand, views the disability 
mainly as “a socially created problem, and principally as a matter of the full integration of 
individuals into society”.  
Under the medical approach, the management of the disability is aimed at cure or the 
individual’s adjustment and behavior change, while under the social approach, it is the 
collective responsibility of society at large to make the environmental modifications 
necessary for the full participation of people with disabilities in all areas of social life. 
Medical care is viewed as the main issue, and at the political level the principal response is 
that of modifying or reforming healthcare policy, while environmental changes is viewed as 
an attitudinal issue, which at political level becomes a question of human rights.    
 14
 
 
a)      
 
  
b)  
 
Figure 1 Smoothed hazard functions- Exits with full or partial disability pension, IP (a) and 
LSIP (b) samples 
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Table 1 Semiparametric estimates for single-risk and competing-risks models of first exit 
due to disability, IP sample 
 
Variable 
All exits Full Pension Partial Pension 
β Std Err HR β 
Std 
Err HR β 
Std 
Err HR 
Women (CG: men) a 0.04 0.21 1.04 -0.07 0.26 0.93 0.29 0.35 1.34 
Married (CG: unmarried) -0.06 0.22 0.94 -0.28 0.28 0.76 0.49 0.38 1.63 
Education level (CG: low)          
   Medium -0.01 0.27 0.99 -0.59 0.40 0.56 0.75 0.41 2.13 
   High -0.25 0.42 0.78 -1.10 0.62 0.33 0.92 0.57 2.52 
Citizenship (CG Swedish born)          
   Naturalized Swede 1.12 0.30 3.06 1.71 0.34 5.53 -0.55 1.02 0.58 
   Foreigner born 1.63 0.35 5.13 2.25 0.39 9.52 0.02 1.03 1.02 
Rehabilitation type          
   Vocational  0.74 0.30 2.09 -0.36 0.44 0.70 2.06 0.44 7.85 
   Medical 1.13 0.31 3.11 0.93 0.40 2.53 1.69 0.49 5.44 
Sickness days before exit b 0.23 0.02 25.60 0.29 0.03 33.00 0.14 0.04 15.00 
Sickness spells before exit -0.08 0.02 -7.90 -0.13 0.03 -12.50 -0.03 0.03 -3.40 
Earnings (1000 SEK) 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.90 
Regional unemployment  0.27 0.08 30.50 0.36 0.10 42.60 0.13 0.13 14.20 
Testing H0: BETA=0*          
   Likelihood ratio 225.45   165.56   97.61   
   Score 394.64 247.84 226.97  
   Wald 251.07   154.31   115.23   
-2 Log-likelihood c 1289.9 1064.5  819.8 654.2  472.4 374.8  
Events| censored cases 116 1680  74 1722  42 1754  
 
Notes: The estimates in bolds are significant at the 10%-level. Italics for hazard ratio (HR) indicate that for 
the continuous variables it had been recomputed as phr = 100*(HR-1).   
* For all models, the degrees of freedom (DF), is 12, and the chi-square statistic is significant beyond 0.001 
level; a CG is the comparison group; b in hundred; c the first value for the case without covariates, and the 
second value for the case with covariates. All these notes apply to Table 2. 
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Table 2 Semiparametric estimates for single-risk and competing-risks models of first exit 
due to disability, LSIP samples 
 
Variable 
All exits Full Pension Partial Pension 
β Std Err HR β 
Std 
Err HR β 
Std 
Err HR 
Women (CG: men) a -0.01 0.08 0.99 0.05 0.10 1.05 -0.08 0.14 0.93 
Married (CG: unmarried) -0.20 0.08 0.82 -0.23 0.10 0.79 -0.16 0.14 0.85 
Education level (CG: low)          
   Medium -0.08 0.11 0.92 -0.27 0.14 0.76 0.23 0.17 1.26 
   High -0.41 0.18 0.66 -0.74 0.24 0.48 0.20 0.28 1.22 
Citizenship (CG Swedish born)          
   Naturalized Swede 0.52 0.14 1.68 0.66 0.17 1.94 0.18 0.26 1.19 
   Foreigner born 0.90 0.15 2.46 1.02 0.18 2.77 0.55 0.27 1.73 
Rehabilitation type          
   Vocational  0.59 0.10 1.80 0.27 0.13 1.31 1.12 0.17 3.07 
   Medical 0.64 0.10 1.90 0.67 0.13 1.95 0.55 0.18 1.73 
Sickness days before exit b 0.11 0.01 11.90 0.13 0.01 14.00 0.07 0.02 7.4 
Sickness spells before exit -0.09 0.01 -8.20 -0.10 0.01 -9.50 -0.06 0.01 -5.4 
Earnings (1000 SEK) 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.8 
Regional unemployment  0.06 0.03 6.10 0.13 0.04 14.10 -0.11 0.06 -10.5 
Testing H0: BETA=0*          
   Likelihood ratio 580.55   430.68   213.48   
   Score 633.91   470.87   235.20   
   Wald 598.76   438.53   221.36   
-2 Log-likelihood c 8941.7 8361.1  5934.3 5503.6  3031.5 2818.0  
Events| censored cases 700 1926  461 2165  239 2387  
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Table A1 Descriptive statistics by individual at “exit” date, IP and LSIP samples 
Variable 
No exit Full disability Partial disability 
IP LSIP IP LSIP IP LSIP 
Women 0.50 0.58 0.46 0.48 0.60 0.54 
Marital status  
(1=married, 0=single) 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.58 
Married women  0.27 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Citizenship       
       Swedish born 0.88 0.85 0.70 0.83 0.95 0.87 
       Naturalized Swedes 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.07 
       Foreign born 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.07 
Educational level       
       Low 0.47 0.56 0.85 0.83 0.66 0.74 
       Medium 0.36 0.34 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.20 
       High 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.06 
Age groups       
      18-35 years 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 
      36-45 years 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.18 
      46-55 years 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.30 
      56-65 years 0.14 0.14 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.45 
Age 
 
41.99 
(10.89) 
42.11 
(10.94) 
53.35 
(9.57) 
52.33 
(8.88) 
53.62 
(8.11) 
51.93 
(9.38) 
Earnings, 1000 SEK 
 
169.80 
(95.08) 
164.79 
(63.34) 
113.60 
(93.10) 
141.06 
(76.40) 
96.60 
(61.32) 
112.04 
(66.34) 
Regional  
unemployment rate (%) 
2.37 
(1.19) 
2.34 
(1.19) 
2.68 
(1.57) 
2.50 
(1.30) 
2.58 
(1.25) 
2.22 
(1.21) 
Sickness spells before exit 
 
9.18 
(9.79) 
14.15 
(11.28) 
3.36 
(4.73) 
4.33 
(4.94) 
5.17 
(6.70) 
5.09 
(6.84) 
Sickness spells after exit 
   
0.08 
(0.49) 
0.12 
(0.88) 
4.79 
(8.61) 
5.63 
(7.91) 
Sickness days before exit 
 
119.27 
(237.48) 
459.33 
(418.02) 
537.77 
(422.45) 
741.74 
(416.92) 
564.69 
(495.24) 
654.20 
(478.48) 
Rehabilitation type       
Vocational  0.03 0.19 0.12 0.21 0.38 0.30 
Medical 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.16 
       
n 1680 1926 74 461 42 239 
 
